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Abstract
The U.S. drone program in Pakistan faces strong resistance in Pakistan.
Because the program solely seeks to eliminate terrorist groups and
leaders through bombing campaigns, with no built in social support, the
local population’s anti-American sentiment has reached the highest level
in history. This angry mood against U.S. drone programs is spreading
throughout the Islamic world. To counter this anti-American sentiment,
and increase the drone program’s effectiveness, the U.S. must invest in
multifaceted, socio-economic support efforts to educate the population
and rebuild the gratuity, trust, and commitment of Pakistan’s people to
the “War on Terror.”
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Introduction 
With the current situations in Iraq and Syria, air strikes and bombing campaigns 
are a popular solution for the U.S. military to hinder terrorist groups such as the 
Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL) that threaten the Middle East. Drone 
programs are touted by political heavyweights such as President Obama and U.S. 
Rear Admiral John Kirby (Pentagon Press Secretary) as the best way to monitor 
terrorist groups, assess their growing threat, and weaken their positions without 
ever threatening an American life. This is because the drones can be flown from 
pilots safely ensconced thousands of miles away on their U.S. military base. 
Unfortunately, we know from a decade of drone campaigns in Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Afghanistan that the air campaign must be a beginning step in a more 
extensive nation-building plan supplemented by rebuilding efforts because air-
only campaigns cannot address cultural and systemic issues that raise anti-
American sentiments and contribute to terrorist cell recruitment.  
 
Drone technology has allowed more accurate targeting of individuals, better 
reconnaissance collection, and protected troops; Drones have also killed innocent 
civilians, destroyed villages, raised levels of anti-American sentiment while 
failing to reduce terrorism in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Yemen. Despite a decade of drone campaigns to counter anti-American efforts, 
the hostility against the United States in these areas has increased and groups 
such as ISIL have emerged. This has to raise the question, “do air-only campaigns 
really work to combat terrorism?” The answer is no and it can be demonstrated 
by analyzing the weaknesses of the U.S. drone program in Pakistan. For the last 
decade, the United States has engaged in a drone campaign in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to combat terrorist groups that pepper the 
region. Despite the deaths of terrorist leaders and years of destruction, terrorism 
is still a pervasive problem in Pakistan and anti-American sentiment is at an all-
time high. This article attempts to highlight the shortcomings of the U.S. policy 
around the drone program in Pakistan and ways in which drone programs could 
be strengthened with socio-economic programs to address systemic problems in 
the country. These supplemental programs should mitigate resentment and 
hostility against the United States before it is permanently engrained in the 
population.  
 
Brief History of the Insurgents and United States-Pakistan Relations 
The United States has always had a volatile relationship with Pakistan. In the 
1950s-1970s, Pakistan was part of the containment effort to stop the spread of the 
Soviet Union. In the 1970s the United States equipped and supported Pakistani 
mujahedin fighters along the border who fought against the Soviet Union 
occupation of Afghanistan. This eventually helped to force Russia’s withdrawal 
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from Afghanistan. No longer useful and radically religious, these former U.S.-
sponsored, mujahedin fighters became well-armed guerrilla groups that spawned 
Islamist jihadists, the Taliban, and al-Qaida in the border area between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This territory is the FATA today.1 
 
After Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, the United States imposed 
sanctions. Despite this, Pakistan has maintained a working relationship with the 
United States since the 1950s. The incentive for Pakistan was more than $73 
billion in military aid from the United States and their partners (World Bank’s 
International Development Association, Japan, United Kingdom, European 
Union, Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and others).2 
 
After the September 11th attacks in 2001, Pakistan became an integral partner to 
the United States in the “War on Terror”; Pakistan was motivated to participate 
in the “War on Terror” because they experienced a surge in Taliban-led violence 
in the FATA. A rejuvenated Pashtun Taliban, funded by drug operations and 
foreign investors, had gained popularity in the FATA by promising the economic 
recovery, improvement to infrastructure, and social services that the government 
had failed to provide despite all of the foreign aid money. Then-President 
Musharraf realized that despite different motives from the United States, 
something had to be done to combat the Taliban from gaining a foothold in 
Pakistan. He realized that the Taliban, an Afghan-bred organization, was 
bleeding over the border and finding support in Pakistan.3 Musharraf agreed to 
work with the United States to stop the Taliban’s encroachment and began 
working with tribal leaders to counter Taliban’s efforts in the FATA. When the 
United States asked to base drone and intelligence operations out of Pakistan to 
hunt down al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Usama bin Ladin using Pakistani runways, 
his government was willing to work with them.4 
 
Pakistan allowed the CIA and the United States military to operate drone 
programs out of secret airbases, move supplies through North Pakistan to 
support military efforts in Afghanistan, and use the Pakistani military for combat 
operations against Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. In exchange, they asked for 
more aid, military training, and arms as they sought to keep control of the 
                                                        
1 Richard Friedman, Frank Schell and Lauren Bean, "American Foreign Policy Towards 
Pakistan," National Strategy Forum Review: Strategic Challenges Near and Far (Fall 
2009), available at: 
http://nationalstrategy.com/NSFReview/Fall2009Vol18Issue3USMexico/PakistanSpec
ialReport.aspx.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Qasim Ilyas, "President Musharraf Interview with Charlie Rose Part 1," YouTube.com, 
January 24, 2007, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t4lQ-_jwt8o. 
4 Johnston, Patrick, Anoop Sarbahi, Stanford University, and Rand Corporation. The 
Impact of US Drone Strkes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Stanford: 
Stanford University, 2014). 
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country and secure their nuclear weapons.5 Pakistan agreed to work with the 
United States to target individuals suspected of militant activities and allow the 
United States government to use surveillance drones to help them target the 
insurgents in the FATA areas. 
 
As a result of its cooperation, Pakistan has received more than $20 billion in U.S. 
aid since 2001.6 The aid is primarily military funding because after the September 
11th attacks, the United States needed the support of the government to run its 
operations, not the hearts of the people. The United States continues to be 
Pakistan’s largest source of military and nonmilitary aid. Unfortunately, much of 
the aid money was used to line government and military coffers and did not make 
it to the impoverished village populations.  
 
To try to address issue of misapplied aid money, in 2009, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act (commonly known as the 
Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, or KBL). KBL was designed to separate the military 
efforts from the development agenda, thus facilitating longer-term planning and 
investment for Pakistan’s people. KBL authorized an investment of more than 
$7.5 billion in Pakistan’s development for fiscal years 2010 to 2014. The funding 
was to be distributed by several federal aid agencies. Distribution of the funds ran 
into trouble as limited capacity of local partners, concerns about corruption and 
security, lack of systematic reforms, and deferred aid after natural disasters, 
made getting money to the correct destination difficult.7 This was in part because 
the United States had not invested in developing a loyal contingency of local 
leaders in Pakistan. After years of corruption, misuse of U.S. aid dollars, ejection 
of the United States military trainers, and the national government’s cooperation 
with insurgent groups, the United States made the decision in 2011 to begin 
reducing the aid package by freezing nonmilitary aid efforts at the current levels, 
and cutting Pakistan’s military aid by approximately $800 million.8 Pakistan is 
still the fourth largest recipient of the United States economic and military aid 
after Israel, Afghanistan, and Egypt.9 
 
 
Drones on a Global Scale 
                                                        
5 Friedman, Schell, and Bean. "American Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan." 
6 Ibid.  
7Staff, “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers,” Center for Global Development, June 01, 2014, 
available at: http://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers. 
8 Colin Cookman, Brian Katulis, Sarah Margon, and Caroline Wadmhams. “The Limits of 
U.S Assistance to Pakistan,” Center for American Progress (July 18, 2011), available at: 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2011/07/18/10007/the-
limits-of-u-s-assistance-to-pakistan/. 
9 Staff, “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers." 
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Unmanned drones were initially used as a reconnaissance tool to gather data 
about the terrain, locate hostile combatants, and other geospatial uses. They were 
first used by the U.S. military in Kosovo and Bosnia but are now widely deployed 
around the world by at least eighty-seven governments.10 Saudi Arabia, the U.K., 
and Israel, all have drone programs of their own.11 Drones are considered an 
invaluable resource because they can silently hover and watch individuals, 
groups, or locations for hours without putting a human pilot at risk. 
Advancements in technology made it possible to make drones larger to carry and 
launch Predator and Hellfire missiles at combatants. This makes armed air 
campaigns possible without risking a pilot’s life in the process. 
 
U.S. Drone Programs in Pakistan 
Under President George W. Bush, the United States began fighting the “War on 
Terror” in Pakistan’s FATA region using drone surveillance and missile strikes. 
Through an agreement with Pakistan’s government and military, the CIA 
launched hundreds of attacks in Northwest Pakistan to flush out Taliban and al-
Qaida guerilla training camps and forces, which were supported by (and 
suspected to have been hiding) Usama bin Ladin—the United States’ number one 
target for his role in the September 11th attacks.12  
 
The U.S. military and CIA designed their drone programs to target terrorist 
organizations and insurgent groups in territories that the United States and allies 
cannot or will not engage in a traditional ground campaign. Pakistan is one of 
these territories because of mountainous terrain, limited ground intelligence 
collection programs, and hostile local populations that threaten the U.S. military 
with a long, convoluted ground campaign. Additionally, Pakistan is generally 
deemed as a friendly government to the U.S. and therefore we would not invade 
an ally’s sovereign territory without their request for help. The U.S. drone 
program in Pakistan was built with its government’s approval and seeks to deter 
terrorists and insurgent organizations by killing and creating fear and uncertainty 
in the insurgent leadership, while minimizing the risk to U.S. military troop. 
However, drones also cause dread and chaos for civilian populations. After more 
than a decade of reconnaissance and hellfire missiles rained down from drones, 
the Pakistani people are pushing back against the American-led programs to clear 
the Taliban and insurgents out of FATA. In Pakistan, anti-American sentiment is 
at an all-time high. 
                                                        
10 Guy Taylor, “U.S. Intelligence Warily Watches for Threats to U.S. Now That 87 Nations 
Possess Drones,” The Washington Times, November 10, 2013. 
11 Akbar Nasir Khan, “US Policy of Targeted Killing by Drones,” IPRI Journal 11:1 (Winter 
2011): 21-40, available at: 
http://www.academia.edu/225132/US_Policy_of_Targeted_Killing_by_Drones_in_P
akistan.  
12 Ibid.  
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Individuals such as Leah Bolger, the president of Veterans for Peace, have 
pointed to this wave of anger against America as evidence that drone programs 
are creating more terrorists than they are terminating. Bolger claims that this is 
because the drones themselves terrorize a population and build resistance to U.S. 
policy and programs.13 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Malala Yousafzai, has also 
spoken out against U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, saying to President Obama 
“Drone attacks are fueling terrorism. Innocent victims are killed in these acts and 
they lead to resentment among the Pakistani people.”14 Resistance to the United 
States in Pakistan is not new but blaming terrorism on drones oversimplifies the 
regional and global conflicts that affect the global Islamic-Arab community and 
contribute to terrorism. Pakistanis generally relate more closely to Islamic-Arab 
countries rather than their Hindu and Asian neighbors. Thus, some of the conflict 
engulfing much of the Islamic-Arab world bleeds into Pakistan. This article will 
not address these conflicts individually, as they would each be extensive 
discussions in themselves, but the reader should take into consideration global 
Islamic-Arab attitudes towards U.S. military campaigns in Iraq, recent conflicts 
in Afghanistan and Iran, U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
its alliance with Saudi Arabia. The drone program does not operate in a bubble 
and as such, outside global influences also contribute to Pakistan’s anti-American 
opinion. This article only considers the U.S. drone program in Pakistan’s 
contribution to these opinions and how the program can be supported to improve 
its success against terrorism. 
 
Growing Anti-American Sentiment 
While successful at disrupting the Taliban and al-Qaida activities, cracks began to 
appear in the partnership with Pakistan as early as 2005. Though drone strikes 
pose much less risk to civilian casualties and are much more accurate in their 
targeting abilities than previous bombing campaigns, the drone efforts 
inadvertently killed many Pakistani civilians, including women and children. The 
debate remains if this is a failure in intelligence communities to accurately screen 
and identify actual terrorist activities and members, or if the casualties are simply 
a wartime result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, with known 
terrorists. One of the main weaknesses of air-only campaigns is that it is hard to 
identify gatherings and individual movements without individuals on the ground 
gathering information from local leaders and civilians. As retired Air Force Lt. 
Gen. Ralph Jodice discusses, without on-the-ground forces, it is difficult to tell 
                                                        
13 Staff, "Drone attacks 'create more enemies with every innocent person killed," Rueters, 
November 19, 2013 Retrieved October 10, 2014, available at: http://rt.com/op-edge/us-
drone-attacks-killings-953/. 
14 CNN Political Unit, "Malala to Obama: Drone strikes 'fueling terrorism'," CNN.com, 
October 12, 2013, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/12/politics/obamas-meet-
malalas/. 
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“friend or foe.” This is because non-state actors are widely dispersed and do not 
use conventional tactics or equipment. They are fighting from trucks with 
makeshift weaponry and no uniforms. “Its pickup truck versus pickup truck and 
they’re wearing the same clothes. They’re not flying flags or wearing insignias.”15 
Therefore identifying a caravan of vehicles heading to a wedding versus a caravan 
of fighters from the air is incredibly difficult without intelligence from the 
ground. The decimation of families, civilians, and innocent children through 
drone strikes has led to major pushback by tribes and local villages against the 
drone efforts. By 2010, Pakistanis were so upset with the United States’ policy 
that bin Laden had higher approval ratings than either President Bush in 
Pakistan. Many Pakistanis continue to feel their opinion of the United States 
would improve drastically if the United States ceased their drone programs.16 
 
To monitor the public Pakistani sentiment, Pew Research Center conducted 
several studies since to track the mood of the Pakistani population towards the 
United States. In 2005, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey that 
revealed fifty-one percent of Pakistanis supported bin Laden and only twenty-
seven percent of Pakistanis supported using their army to fight Taliban and al-
Qaida militant groups in the FATA.17 In 2008, this had shifted so that twenty-four 
percent of Pakistanis still supported bin Laden and thirty-eight percent of 
Pakistanis supported their Army confronting the Taliban and guerilla groups. 
After nearly a decade of drone programs, in 2010, a Pew Research Center survey 
showed fifty-nine percent of Pakistanis described the United States as an enemy. 
A mere eleven percent saw the United States as a partner in the battle against 
terrorism, and just seventeen percent of Pakistanis had a favorable view at all of 
the United States. Eight percent believed that President Obama would do the 
right thing in the world. This was lower than bin Laden’s approval level ever fell. 
Sixty-four percent thought that it was important for relations with the United 
States to improve.18 
 
A follow up survey, two years later in 2012, showed that Pakistani discontent with 
the United States policy had grown. Roughly seventy-four percent of Pakistanis 
considered the United States an enemy. President Obama’s ratings were no better 
than the 2010 survey suggested. Only forty-five percent still said it was important 
to improve relations with the United States. A mere seventeen percent backed 
                                                        
15 Kristina Wong, "Syria strikes need on-the-ground intel, say defense experts," The Hill, 
September 10, 2014, available at: http://thehill.com/policy/defense/217328-syria-
strikes-needs-on-the-ground-intel-say-experts. 
16 Pew Research, “Pakistanis See US as an Enemy,” Pew Research Center, August 12, 
2010, available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/pakistanis-see-u-s-as-
an-enemy/. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
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American drone strikes against leaders of extremist groups.19 The 2013 another 
Pew Research Study, revealed only slightly better opinions of the United States. 
Approximately sixty-four percent of Pakistanis now see the United States as more 
of an enemy than a partner. To compound this issue, the percentage of Pakistanis 
who think having better relationships with the United States is important has 
also declined in recent years. Extremist groups remain unpopular; the percentage 
of people who believe the Taliban is a very serious threat is up from thirty-seven 
percent in 2012 to forty-nine percent in 2013. Albeit this concern, the majority of 
the population does not think that the U.S. drone program is actually combating 
terrorism. Roughly sixty-eight percent oppose the drone strikes and only a third 
of the respondents believe the drone strikes are necessary to defend Pakistan 
from extremist groups. The majority of respondents, (seventy-four percent), 
believe that the drones kill too many innocent people. This opposition to the 
drones has lowered the positive view of the United States by Pakistanis to a level 
lower than it was throughout much of President George W. Bush’s 
administration.20 Pakistanis do not like the threat of the Taliban nor al-Qaida 
stemming from Afghanistan, but they also object to the United States conducting 
operations in their area, which has impacted their daily lives, destroyed families, 
and killed innocents for more than a decade. These deaths create grievances 
against the United States and Pakistan authorities that resonate across the 
country. 
 
In 2010 The New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow conducted a 
survey of face-to-face interviews of FATA residents ages 18 years or older across 
120 villages. Nearly nine out of ten people in FATA opposed the U.S. military 
pursuing al-Qaida and the Taliban in their region. Nearly seventy-percent of 
FATA residents felt the Pakistani government should tackle the problem without 
the help of the U.S. government. More than seventy-five percent of FATA 
residents directly opposed the strikes and only sixteen-percent of respondents 
think that the strikes accurately target insurgents. Many hold the United States 
partially responsible for the increase of terrorist activities in their areas. This 
unfavorable view of the drone program does not mean the population supports 
al-Qaida nor the Taliban. More than three-quarters of FATA residents oppose the 
presence of either group in their region and would not support them on political 
ballots. Like the Pew Research Studies, many respondents claim that their 
                                                        
19 Pew Research, “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of US,” Pew Research 
Center, June 27, 2012, available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27/pakistani-
public-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/. 
20 Pew Research, “On the Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” Pew 
Research Center, May 7, 2013, available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/on-
eve-of-elections-a-dismal-public-mood-in-pakistan/. 
Hall: Help Wanted: American Drone Program
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
 64 
 
opinion of the United State would improve dramatically if the United States 
ceased their drone programs in their area.21 
 
In 2013 protests of the drone program shut down U.S. and NATO supply routes 
across Northern Pakistan.22 These supply routes not only supplied the efforts of 
the drone program, but it also supplied the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan 
through passes in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. When the 
Pakistanis blocked the roads, it paralyzed drawdown efforts to get equipment and 
troops out of Afghanistan. The United States and NATO halted the removal of 
equipment from Afghanistan through Pakistan at the end of 2013. These 
roadblocks resulted in millions of dollars of American equipment being 
temporarily stuck in Afghanistan as troops withdrew.23 
 
Hostility against the drone program ensued, as the population demanded its 
government cease the program and change their domestic security policies. In an 
effort to appease protesters, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called for a pause in 
the drone program at the end of 2013 as peace negotiations with the Pakistan 
Taliban began.24 These peace talks proved unfruitful and in June 2014 Prime 
Minister Sharif announced a full-scale operation to flush out Taliban in the 
FATA. This is the first solo operation Pakistan has initiated in the region and they 
have requested help from the Afghan National Army to secure border regions. 
There are mixed views by civilians as to whether or not the Pakistani military can 
tackle the Taliban and terrorists on their factions of its own civil government is 
suspected to have given aid to the insurgents in the past.25 The campaign is also 
seen as a military effort to drag the civilian government into the fight against the 
Taliban, which is creating a larger divide between civilian and military efforts. 
The program will not address plans to rehabilitate any internally displace 
persons. The civilian government has not made any budget allocations to achieve 
                                                        
21 Peter Bergen, Patrick Doherty, and Ballen Ken, “Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal 
Regions,” New American Foundation (March 25, 2014). 
22 Zulfiqar Ali, “The United States Halts Truck Shipments through Pakistan Amid Anti-
drone Protests,” L.A. Times, December 04, 2013, available at: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/04/world/la-fg-wn-pakistan-afghanistan-nato-
truck-blockade-20131204. 
23 Phil Stewart, “US Stops Cargo Shipments on Afghanistan-Pakistan Land Route, Citing 
Fears about Protests,” December 03, 2013, available at: 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/us-stops-cargo-shipments-afghanistan-
pakistan-land-route-citing-fears-f2D11691906.  
24 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistani PM Urges Stop to US Drone Strikes,” Voice of America, October 
22, 2013, available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/us-accused-of-unlawful-
killings-pakistan-drone-strikes/1774276.html.  
25 Kamal Siddiqi, "Our own enemies," Tribune.com, December 2, 2012, available at: 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/474166/our-own-enemies/. 
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goals laid out in national security policy that makes efforts to stop the Taliban 
unlikely to be successful.26 
 
Weaknesses of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan 
Terrorism and insurgents arise through complex situations that can involve 
socio-economics, religion, politics, failed states, fear, and other hybrids of issues. 
The drone program only seeks to disrupt insurgents’ organization and 
communication by destroying insurgent forces, logistical facilities, transport 
assets, leadership targets, communication systems, and key chokepoints (such as 
bridges and overpasses). The program feeds civilian anxiety with no social 
support to mitigate emotional outrage. Their populations only see the destruction 
of their homes and deaths of their family members that the drones bring, which 
according to analysts such as Bolger, this causes them to fight harder against the 
attackers and join forces such as the Taliban. However, research shows that 
drones cannot be proven to directly increase nor decrease terror organizations’ 
recruitment levels. 
 
The United States continues to use drones because according to intelligence, 
statistically collected data, and the policy makers, the drones are effective at 
disrupting militant and terror groups’ organizations, making it harder for them to 
implement large acts of violence. Then-Senator John Kerry claimed in 2009 that 
it had eliminated fourteen of the top twenty terrorists through this program. The 
Obama Administration claims the drones have eliminated twenty of al-Qaida’s 
top thirty leaders from 2009 to 2012. The New America Foundation claims that 
the strikes have killed twenty-eight senior al-Qaida leaders, and more than fifty-
one militants from 2004 to 2013.27 
 
In a recent address to the 2014 graduating class of West Point, President Obama 
outlined the framework for foreign policy. Regarding the drones, he said “the 
United States will continue to take direct action using drone strikes when 
necessary to protect ourselves but that a drone strike should only occur when 
there is “a near certainty” that no civilians will be harmed.”28 The United States 
has not conducted a drone strike in Pakistan since December 2013.29 This is the 
                                                        
26 Mateen Haider, "NW Operation to continue until terrorism is eliminated," Dawn.com, 
June 17, 2014, available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1113129. 
27 Bergen, Doherty and Ken, “Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal Regions." 
28 " Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement 
Ceremony,” Office of the Press Secretary, the White House May 28, 2014, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-
states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony 
29 It is suspected, but not proven, that the U.S. drone strikes have been reactivated in 
Pakistan as of October 2014; Zahir Shah Sherazi and Jason Hanna, "Drone strikes kill 8 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, sources Say," CNN.com, October 11, 2014, available at: 
Hall: Help Wanted: American Drone Program
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
 66 
 
longest pause in the program. President Obama also restated in the speech, his 
desire to move the drone program from the CIA to the military to improve 
transparency. The U.S. Congress opposes this move.30 
 
The United States defends its drone campaigns by reminding international 
audiences that it is at war with these terror organizations and, under 
international war standards, it is able to target individuals plotting to do harm 
against the United States or its citizens. Arguments can be made for and against 
the success of the United States drone programs. According to a 2013 report for 
the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and Army War College by James Walsh, three 
conflicting academic reports have surfaced regarding the drone’s effectiveness in 
Pakistan. One study claims that the drones reduce the number and severity of 
terrorist attacks in the FATA territories. Another finds that drone strikes are 
associated with more, not less, acts of terrorism as retaliation for the drone 
strikes. Finally, the third finds that civilian deaths have no consistent 
relationships with terrorism in Pakistan.31 
 
Because of these conflicting academic reports, Patrick Johnston and Rand 
Corporation released study called The Impact of the U.S. Drone Strikes on 
Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2014. This study looked at direct 
correlations between the drone strikes and terrorist activities using empirical 
research methods. The results support the theory that the U.S. programs have 
succeeded in curbing deadly attacks within the targeted territory in Pakistan. The 
study shows that drone strikes are generally associated with a reduced rate of 
terrorist attacks, reduction of number of people killed as a result of terrorist 
attacks, and decreases in lethal or intimidating attacks (such as IEDs or suicide 
attacks). However, it also states that this does not suggest that groups are 
dispersing or leaving the territories being hit by drones.32 The empirical evidence 
also cannot collaborate the claims that the drone programs have increased terror 
organizations’ recruitment numbers, as there is no concrete way to measure the 
changes of levels in terrorist enlistment.  
 
While directly linking drone strikes to terrorist recruitment is difficult, arguing 
that anti-American sentiment by civilians in Pakistan has increased because of 
the drone program is not hard. More than a decade of Pew Research studies and 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/11/world/asia/pakistan-afghanistan-drone-
strikes/index.html. 
30 “Obama: US Will Still Use Drone Strikes.”  
31 James Igoe Walsh, "The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and 
Counterterrorism Campaigns," Strategic Studies Institute and Army War College Press, 
September 2013, available at: 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1167.pdf.  
32 Johnston, Sarbahi, Stanford University, and Rand Corporation. The Impact of US 
Drone Strkes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
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the New American Foundation surveys, prove that the general opinion of 
Pakistan’s population is directly related to the drone program. Respondents also 
claimed that limiting or ceasing the drone programs could easily reverse the 
negative opinion. However, ceasing the programs entirely could lead to increased 
terrorist activity, as groups will be able to reorganize and launch retaliatory 
attacks. Ending the programs would not address the full problem. The anti-
American sentiment could be mitigated by giving the civilian population 
alternative ways to be prosperous, productive, and safe, while continuing 
President Obama’s 2013 initiative to ensure that the individuals targeted by the 
drones are truly connected to insurgent or terrorist groups.  
 
One big flaw in the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is that it fails to negate 
terrorist abilities and recruitment because is not a well-rounded plan. Bombing 
campaigns and air assaults should be one part of a synergistic nation-building 
effort because they can disrupt insurgent operations by taking out the key 
facilities mentioned above. Air campaigns alone do not address systemic culture 
or economic issues that cause local populations to side with terrorist 
organizations. Drones should be part of a long-term commitment to rehabilitate a 
country, monitor progress, and disrupt insurgent activities but on its own will 
never be effective in ending terrorism. Even President Obama observed in an 
interview that military intervention not backed by a major effort to build a 
functional state afterwards would simply lead to chaos and a new set of threats to 
American interests.33 Unfortunately, he has not applied systems to address his 
own observation in countries with drone programs such as Pakistan.  
 
Reaction to U.S. Drone Programs in Yemen and Elsewhere 
The Pakistanis people’s cries of outrage are echoed in Yemen, where a similar 
drone campaign has been ongoing since 2002. Beginning shortly after the 
September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush worked with the Yemeni 
government to fight insurgents in Yemen using drones. Initially the Yemeni 
government took credit for the drones. However, evidence of U.S. missiles was 
discovered in the wreckage of drone strikes. An outcry emanated from the public 
and the Yemeni government admitted that the CIA backed their efforts. In 
Yemen, it is estimated that there have been more than 108 drone strikes, with the 
vast majority of those happening since 2010. As in Pakistan, the strikes in Yemen 
have been a collaborated effort between the CIA and the U.S. military, and the 
Yemeni military and government. Estimates put the death toll at more than 900 
people. Approximately one-third of those were civilian casualties. The United 
                                                        
33 K.M. Pollack, "Assessing the Obama Administration's Iraq-Syria Strategy," Brookings 
Institute, September 26, 2014, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-
saban/posts/2014/09/26-pollack-assessing-obama-administration-iraq-syria-
strategy. 
Hall: Help Wanted: American Drone Program
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
 68 
 
States claims to have killed at least thirty-five key al-Qaida leaders including 
Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni born Imam who moved to the United States and 
became a naturalized citizen. Awlaki later radicalized against the United States in 
events after September 11th bombings. He is believed to have aided al-Qaida. He 
and his son were two of the few U.S. citizens targeted by the drone programs. The 
drones are also believed to have eliminated Fahd al-Quso, who was suspected of 
involvement in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.34 
 
On December 12th, 2013, a drone strike hit a large wedding party’s caravan. 
Between eleven to fifteen individuals were killed. It was later revealed that the 
U.S. and Yemeni governments thought they were targeting an insurgent’s convoy 
but had killed innocent civilians instead.35 Anger against the drone program hit 
an all-time high. Yemeni officials begin to voice apprehension and doubt of the 
joint program. Cries that the strikes violate Yemeni’s sovereignty were loud but 
hard to prove since the Yemeni government and military actively involved in the 
planning and targeting of the strikes, and condoned the programs since 
inception. Nabeel Khoury, the deputy chief of mission in Yemen from 2004 to 
2007, stated,  
 
“Drone strikes take out a few bad guys to be sure, but they also kill a large 
number of innocent civilians. Given Yemen’s tribal structure, the United 
States generates roughly forty to sixty new enemies for every AQAP [al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula] operative killed by drones.”36 
 
Despite increased numbers of drone strikes, and rising civilian casualties, al-
Qaida’s activities in Yemen steadily increased. This led to concerns of the 
program’s effectiveness. Local political analysts and tribal leaders claim that, in 
the provinces where the drone strikes occur most often, many civilians radicalize 
against the United States and this has spawned an increase in terrorist activity 
and recruitment into al-Qaida. Yemen officials have called for more limited, and 
specific targeting.37 The program was paused from December 2013 through 
March of 2014. Strikes have since resumed at a slower pace. 
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Many of the issues in Pakistan are problems in Yemen as well. Yemen also has a 
high unemployment rate for their young men and large diasporas communities 
with tribal loyalties. Free education is often only provided through madrasas in 
many areas of the country. Many madrasas indoctrinate students with anti-
American messages, and radical Islam teachings. Villages lack basic amenities 
such as clean water and electricity, and most do not have trades to sustain an 
economy. The villages operate under local village leaders and the central 
government does not hold much power in tribal areas. In both countries, 
programs that give people the opportunities to be self-sustaining and avoid 
turning to resources provided by insurgent groups should supplement the drone 
program. By helping the locals build schools, infrastructure, social services, and 
economies, the U.S., Pakistani, and Yemeni governments can win gratitude and 
provide alternatives. The education institutions should be available for any boy or 
girl, and promote critical thinking, pro-democratic, and well-rounded 
curriculums including trade skills to build local economic sustainability and 
employment. 
 
While the drone programs in Libya and Somalia are younger than the programs 
in Yemen and Pakistan, they are built on the same eliminate-but-not-support 
policy as their predecessors. Because Somalia and Libya share many of the same 
general population and social struggles of Pakistan and Yemen, they will 
eventually run into the same resistance and issues that are now being seen in 
Yemen and Pakistan. This negative sentiment can be stopped before it starts in 
Somalia and Libya, if the United States works with governments to invest in 
nation-building activities to support drone campaigns. 
 
The Drones Can Work with Multifaceted Support 
The drone program in Pakistan (and others in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya) can be 
effective in eliminating terrorism if it is one tactic in a larger strategic plan. In 
order to balance destruction, death, and radical teachings against the United 
States, there has to be investment in education, rebuilding, and powerful 
counter-narratives from moderate or public sources. As the Blitzkrieg proved in 
London, resistant movements and civilian populations are resilient under 
repeated bombings and destruction, so missiles alone will not stop terrorist 
organizations. However, the United States has the tools, expertise, and resources, 
to ensure that drones are supported by other nation-building operations that will 
build goodwill towards America and take steps to eliminate terrorism. A 
multifaceted campaign using all of the components discussed here should 
succeed in rebuilding the American image in Pakistan by providing people 
options for employment, economic sustainability, and a better life other than 
joining insurgent organizations. The key supplements to enhance the 
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effectiveness of drone programs and create a successful campaign to rebuild 
American support are: 
 
• Ensuring foreign aid money is distributed to the villages by local or state 
officials by working with the Pakistani government 
• Working within the tribal system’s leaderships to build support of U.S. 
initiatives 
• Distributing verbal and printed materials explaining and supporting U.S. 
programs 
• Leveraging social media and Internet to counter anti-American rhetoric 
and repackaging the war propaganda as a secular war instead of a war on 
Islam by the United States. 
• Educating local populations on alternatives and options available to them 
that do not include the Taliban, al-Qaida or insurgent paths 
• Free and public education options for boys and girls to negate radical 
teachings in madrasas 
• Building infrastructure such as water systems, power grids, medical 
facilities, roads, energy facilities, etc. 
 
The United States can provide resources to the local and state officials to create a 
secure, educated, and economically sustainable programs in Pakistan. The drone 
programs should reinforce anti-terrorism efforts by destroying any reorganizing 
attempts the insurgent groups make. The insurgents will no longer be able to 
provide more attractive alternatives to the population for recruitment purposes. 
American sentiment should improve as civilians see the United States and their 
government investing in their villages and socio-economic well-being.  
 
Working with Locals and the Pakistani Government 
The United States needs to partner with Pakistan’s government and local tribal 
governments to ensure aid is used to build education programs, economic 
opportunity, and infrastructure that provide alternatives to the Taliban and al-
Qaida’s provisions. The current drone program simply seeks to kill terrorists in 
the hopes that the program will eliminate them faster than organizations can 
recruit, train, and reorganize individuals in terror plots against the West. It 
depends on the Pakistani government’s honesty to independently distribute aid 
and initiate nation-building programs to help its own people. Unfortunately, 
because there has been no investment by the Pakistani government in the local 
population’s education, trade, skills, jobs, economy, or infrastructure, civilians 
are forced to turn to the groups who promise it these opportunities. As Robert 
Rotberg states, citizens naturally turn towards sectional and community loyalties 
in times of insecurity and state weakness because they are their main default 
source of economic opportunity and security. They transfer allegiances to clan 
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and group leaders, even warlords, when their government fails to produce the 
resources they need feel safe and to create economic sustainability.38 In Pakistan, 
the Taliban and al-Qaida, which are well-funded by radical oil barons, adversarial 
nations, and drug trades, offer payment for martyrs, family welfare plans, schools 
(madrasas), employment, a purpose in life, and “security” in an area with no 
alternatives.  
 
Until the Pakistani government steps up to build these institutions, or can agree 
on a plan to work with the United States to do so, local villagers will continue to 
seek refuge and help from the sources they feel empathize with their pain and 
burdens. The plans to negate terrorist organizations solely through drone 
programs and airstrikes will continue to fail because they do not address the 
systemic social problems. The Pakistani government will continue to feel 
backlash and pressure from its citizens to cease the programs. Resentment 
towards the United States will grow until it is an engrained psychosomatic 
symptom that is not easily erased from the minds and hearts of the Pakistani 
people.  
 
The drone program can help Pakistan’s government to secure border areas and 
territories in conflict to provide civilians with a sense of security needed to begin 
rebuilding. The Pakistani government must be pushed to provide the necessary 
resources to foster a peaceful environment such as medical facilities, schools and 
educational instruction, infrastructure, and fair judicial system to mediate 
disputes.39 The United States can hasten this effort by providing expertise to the 
Pakistani government, and incentivizing them to appropriately distribute 
economic aid in order to receive their coveted military aid. The current system of 
freezing economic aid while decreasing military aid does not promote Pakistani 
cooperation because it does not give them any additional reason to distribute 
economic aid. The U.S. government must develop relationships on the local levels 
to ensure money can be properly distributed to civilians.  
 
How Covert Operations with Local Leaders and Propaganda are 
Effective 
Through covert operations, the United States has a long history of using 
multifaceted propaganda and social campaigns in combination with military 
efforts to combat its enemies. In 1948, following World War II, the United States 
used a significant covert political operation to ensure that the rising communist 
party in Italy did not gain the government through elections. The United States 
funneled millions of dollars to the Italian Christian Democratic Party and right-
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wing Socialist parties. They created pro-democratic propaganda to drum up 
support and created a massive media campaign to mobilize Italian voters against 
Communist-Socialist coalitions. It kept communism out of Europe, ensured 
relations between Italy with Presidents Truman and Taft, and opened the door to 
stop communist movements in Greece and Turkey. As part two of the plan, 
economic aid was given to those countries that resisted communist leanings and 
allowed them to participate in American reconstruction efforts. This campaign 
shaped Italian, Greek, and to some extent Turkish, views of America.40 
 
In Afghanistan in 2001, the first CIA team (supported by the U.S. military) into 
Afghanistan after the September 11th bombings, worked with cultural and 
language experts while coordinating military air and fire support. The team 
worked with local tribal leaders to instill good will for the Americans, paid for 
supplies through the mountains, encouraged education for men and women, 
explained the United States’ reasons for being in the country including the 
benefits to security and stability to the individual tribal leaders, and negotiated 
with the government to create a U.S. support system. They went to remote areas 
where traditional boots-on-the-ground military campaigns were not an option, 
spoke with people in the villages, and determined the best course of actions while 
gathering intelligence and distributing verbal propaganda and monetary aid to 
build support. The U.S. men on the ground helped village leaders determine who 
the “bad guys” were (al-Qaida and Taliban) and who the “good guys” were (the 
United States, United Kingdom, NATO troops, certain Afghanistan tribal 
leaders). The U.S. operatives helped villagers identify leaders in their 
communities and created tribal round tables that centralized power in the region. 
They also monitored the progress of social programs and ensured funds were 
spent on approved items. This campaign worked effectively for the first eighteen 
months that the United States was in Afghanistan.41 These are just two examples 
of how the United States has successfully run covert campaigns that could be 
used as complementary programs to strengthen the success of the drone 
programs. The United States has the resources to implement a strategy 
combining propaganda campaigns to educate Pakistanis about the drone 
campaign targeting with a cohesive plan to build relationships with local leaders 
while helping the Pakistani government centralize power in diaspora 
communities and implementing socio-economic development. 
 
Although it must be careful that it does not appear to manipulate the government 
processes or circumvent the Pakistani government, the United States should use 
a covert propaganda campaigns to explain specifically whom they are targeting 
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and build relationships with local populations to gain their trust. As Brookings 
Institute analyst, Madiha Afzal states, “Militancy in Pakistan is essentially a war 
of ideas and narratives and it’s completely naïve to think you can ‘buy’ your way 
out of it through economic growth. What needs tackling is the radical 
narrative.”42 
 
The United States does not need to share individual names, nor give away specific 
operational plans but it should explain to local communities who the groups are, 
why they are a threat to the local and world populations, and why the drone 
programs are the best options to stop them through common propaganda 
mediums (such as fliers, matchbooks, internet, newspapers etc.). By explaining 
whom these groups are, the United States provides a sense of security to the 
general population because the people understand they will not be targeted if 
they do not commit certain actions and therefore should be safe. Currently, the 
local populations fear the drones, in part, because the targets do not make sense 
and they ban together to protect themselves, create mini-militias, or work with 
the groups that the drones are targeting. This unintentionally makes them 
targets.  
 
The United States has to work with the local and state governments to help 
promote the drone operations. This is in part because the United States needs a 
supply of information and materials to conduct their missions accurately. The 
local tribesmen and leaders hold control on the territories, access roads, and 
infrastructure, and influence on their populations. They also generally know the 
families in their areas and can spot growing unrest or threats much faster than 
the United States can from the air. The United States also needs their support to 
reduce fear, resentment, and aggression towards the drone program as leaders of 
their communities. The United States will have to risk the lives of a few plain-
clothed men on the ground in order to build effective relationships with these 
leaders but do not have to commit large military ground-troops to accomplish 
this goal. Without local tribal leaders, no drone program will never be a success 
because the local leaders will work against the program.  
 
In countries like Afghanistan, the United States gave the money directly to 
individual tribal leaders to use it in their areas as they saw fit.43 Sometimes this 
led to corruption or embezzlement but much of the time these leaders would help 
their communities with it. The United States can tackle nation development 
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projects by combining both strategies. They can work from the top Pakistani 
authorities down but they can also build relationships on local levels and work 
from the bottom up. A large strategic plan must be created to unify both efforts 
and the United States will have to balance covert operations to influence local 
level efforts with national policy endeavors. If the Pakistani government will 
commit to improving living conditions through socio-economic development, the 
relationships the United States builds through the programs could help the 
Pakistani government regain control of the conflict territories and build diverse 
coalitions that will work with the government to tackle security concerns and 
development strategies in their regions.  
 
Changing the Dialogue-Media and Messaging 
An additional challenge for the drone program is the speed at which information 
travels in the digital age of flash media, instantaneous news, and easily accessible 
Internet. Anti-American sentiment will only continue to spread to all corners of 
the globe because negative sentiments spread more rapidly44. American foreign 
policy or military actions towards Islamic-Arab states continues to fuel anti-
American sentiment throughout much of the Islamic world. Examples of these 
actions are the full support for the State of Israel, Operation Dessert Storm, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, invasion of Afghanistan, and the treatment of the 
Koran in military detention facilities. Muslim leaders have claimed the drone 
campaigns are another example of Christian expansion and anti-Islamic policies. 
Many Muslims, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, feel their land, resources, culture, and 
religion are under attack by Christian-Western nation states. American policy 
provides radical Islamic organizations the material to persuade local, 
uneducated, populations of this attack against them. With few or no alternative 
narratives to counter it, this perception becomes the reality. To this unsupported 
population, drones are just another step to by America to eradicate Islam, Arab 
culture, and their families. The individuals who are targeted by the U.S. drones 
are not terrorist to Pakistan’s populations; rather they are beloved relatives 
fighting to defend their cultural or religious beliefs that they feel are under attack. 
To the Pakistani civilians, their loved ones who fight against the U.S. drones and 
attacks are no different than the U.S. soldier who signs up to serve to defend the 
United States.  
 
To counter the common belief that the drone program is a war on religious 
culture, practices, and ethnic beliefs, the United States needs a counter message 
of war for domestic security—not as a policy against radical Islam—but as a policy 
against any attacks on their citizens by any country or individual, foreign or 
domestic regardless of religion. This message has been grossly marginalized as 
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sensational reporting and more radical politicians voice their strategies for a 
Judeo-Christian war on Islam. The South Asian Americans Leading Together 
released a report claiming from 2011 to 2014, there were 160 reports of 
xenophobic political rhetoric directed against Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Middle 
Eastern, Arab, and South Asian communities by U.S. political leaders. Ninety 
percent were motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment.45 When the U.S. 
representatives use terms such as “fight with jihadists” as used by The Wall Street 
Journal or Michelle Bachmann’s “War on Islam” describing Islamic 
fundamentalists as barbaric, and calling this a “spiritual warfare,” they pigeon 
hole the United States into the religious war messaging that the terrorists are 
using to recruit members of the Islamic community.46 To rebrand this message 
the United States has to implement a solid propaganda and media campaign that 
is consistently secular in language to change the messaging one delivery channel 
at a time. Any Administration official must uphold American values of fairness 
and equality, and strongly condemn hateful rhetoric by other political figures. 
Whether its through the education system, social media, television, radio, 
political propaganda, or print, official representatives of the United States must 
adjust their language to a security position and not a war on religion to diminish 
the recruitment messaging of the Muslim insurgents.  
 
The Pakistani Muslim population already believes that they are under attack for 
their religion because of this common messaging. Throughout history, aggression 
toward cultural identity and religion has always caused populations to grow 
defensive and fearful for their way of life. In response, many cultures arm 
themselves, which causes their neighbors to increase their arms in defense and 
each country continues to heighten their defenses in response to the other until 
logical defense becomes completely illogical and causes conflict.47 In a sense, the 
message of war on Islam has caused Pakistanis to go on the defense; the U.S. 
drone program only heightens this sense of impending attack because civilians 
see the United States monitoring their views and killing their loved ones in 
strikes; drones cause them to further seek defenses by aiding insurgent groups 
such as al-Qaida and the Taliban who say they will take on the United States and 
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stop the drones in defense of their religion. If the United States can change its 
messaging to deescalate the message of war on cultural and religious identity, it 
should lessen some, but not all, of the tension as Pakistanis realize the drones are 
a fight against those individuals who (plan to) attack the United States and not 
against Islam.  
 
The United States should deliberately leverage the propaganda machine created 
by the Internet to spread its mission as well. In order to spread a pro-American 
message and overtake the negative messages, the United States must use it even 
more effectively and intentionally than others who take it to express their 
dissatisfaction. It has been proven that angry sentiment spreads faster than other 
emotion on the Internet and it can be used to reach and motivate thousands of 
people in the shortest amount of time in history.48 Even in the remotest villages 
of Pakistan, people rely on the Internet to speak with loved ones, follow the news, 
and organize their daily lives. America must look at the Internet as investment 
opportunity, and leverage it to counteract the negative sentiment posted every 
day. It can respond to posts of outrage, exploit positive statistics, discredit the 
organizations using it, explain benefits of programs, and promote open dialogue 
with productive counter-terrorism messaging through social and print media. If 
done in a timely fashion, the Internet also allows the United States to post its 
version of events for the public to weigh in their consideration. Too often, 
individuals on the ground or the terrorist themselves post pictures of drone 
destruction with their version of the situation and the United States is slow to 
respond with a defense—if they do at all.49 If the United States posted its story 
before the insurgents portray it as an attack on Islam or civilians than it may 
reduce some fear and chaos against which the general population is rebelling.  
 
Education 
Education is an incredibly important way to spread positive messaging and 
rebuild countries. The United States needs to encourage free-schools for boys and 
girls in Pakistan. Pakistan’s Constitution entrusts the Federal Government with 
the responsibility for policy planning, and promotion of educational facilities in 
the federated territories. It also recognizes that education is a basic right of every 
citizen and crucial for economic development and poverty alleviation. The 
Federal Ministry of Education administers the public education system but 
divisions of district responsibilities decentralized the power of the programs. 
Reforms to abolish the British education system to educate only the elite have 
failed because of the weak management and supervision structure, shortage of 
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educators and physical facilities, and extremely low funding.50 Generally, 
Pakistan’s expenditure on education is less than two percent of the gross 
domestic product—about $2 million.51 This is insignificant money for a country of 
over 180 million people.52 The literacy rate in Pakistan is estimated to be around 
fifty percent for men, and thirty-eight percent for females; the gender-based 
discrepancy in education levels has contributed to the persistence of illiteracy and 
underdevelopment of Pakistan because women in the communities would 
generally lead education for young children in these communities; but they 
cannot pass on the knowledge they do not possess. Impoverished families taking 
young children out of school to work to provide household income also 
compounds the literacy population. Approximately half of the student population 
drops out before completing primary education and it is estimated more than 
four million children from ages five to nine years old never attend school. Rural 
communities have seen a huge decline in public school enrollment in rural 
communities since 1998. This is largely because public education systems have 
not been established or sustained in rural communities and even urban areas 
have seen huge privatization efforts in education systems. This privatization 
eliminates the impoverished populations’ access to education.53  
 
The Taliban and al-Qaida have quickly capitalized on this need for education and 
vacuum created by privatization and disorganization by creating madrasas. 
Madrasas are schools that teach reading and religious history based on the 
Koran. They are almost-always for boys only, and nearly-always radical in their 
fundamental religious teaching. They are a pervasive influence on the anti-
American sentiment in rural Pakistani communities. Their curriculum is 
generally rote memorization and does not include skills to pursue trade or 
business. The madrasas have proved to be fertile recruitment grounds for 
terrorist organizations. In 2009, ninety-percent of suicide bombers in Pakistan 
were between the ages of sixteen to eighteen years old. Taliban commander Qari 
Hussein, boasts about recruiting children as young as five or six years old 
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through the madrasas to become suicide bombers and help the jihad. Many of 
these schools promote anti-American sentiment and that Islam is under attack by 
the United States. They claim the only way to stop the U.S. drone program is 
through guerilla tactics, violent resistance, and jihad.54  
 
Providing alternatives to the madrasas, and education for women, are critical 
issues in most developing Arab countries. Educating women and girls, has proven 
to build sustainable economies in Africa, India, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, where 
women are traditionally excluded from education because of religious or cultural 
beliefs. Including them in education is a huge component to a successful, secure 
state because women can contribute to household incomes and economic 
sustainability.55 Providing free-schooling in rural communities for boys and girls, 
and working with community leaders to encourage education for their children 
are two huge components to minimize terrorist influence on areas. Through 
schools and education the United States has the ability to teach information that 
will promote democracy, equal rights, tolerance, and critical-thinking by 
providing students with global perspectives, secular history, and alternative 
resources for information. In free, secular schools, critical-thinking can be taught 
through science, math, and reading courses that encourage more than rote 
memorization. Education is the best way to shape the youth of an area, reshape 
engrained beliefs by promoting positive dialogue and discussion about different 
governmental and cultural systems, and discourage youth from joining extremist 
groups. It provides students with training and skills necessary to build trade and 
manage businesses in their village and allows them to consider work beyond that 
provided by militias and radical extremist groups.  
 
The United States has the experience to help Pakistan educate teachers and build 
facilities in these underserved communities. More importantly, the United States 
can make its military aid to Pakistan contingent upon implementing measures to 
strengthen its public education system and distributing U.S. economic and 
development aid for these programs. Development aid must extend to build basic 
amenities such as electric power and fresh water systems. Energy shortages are 
common to Pakistan and create political unrest that in turns reduces the 
government's ability to provide security and stability to the country; this sense of 
security is crucial to persuade the establishment of permanent communities as an 
alternative to organization of insurgent communities. 
 
                                                        
54 Kalsoom Lakhani, “Indoctrinating Children; The Making of Pakistan's Suicide 
Bombers,” Counter Terrorism Center, June 03, 2010, available at: 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/indoctrinating-children-the-making-of-
pakistan%E2%80%99s-suicide-bombers. 
55 Kathy Matsui, “The Economic Benefits of Educating Women,” Bloomberg Media, 
March 07, 2013, available at: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/the-
economic-benefits-of-educating-women. 
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The United States proved in Italy and Afghanistan (albeit only the initial surge), 
that it can effectively leverage media and propaganda, create education and social 
programs, and work with local leaders to stop anti-American groups (such as 
communists and insurgents) in their tracks. To be successful again, the U.S. 
government has to think offensively, constructively, and creatively to build a 
long-term, multifaceted policy that ensures America does not have to fight a 
cyclical cycle of unrest because it did not make proper investments in the first 
place.  
 
Conclusion 
The current U.S. drone program in Pakistan addresses a very singular goal: kill 
terrorists before they can recruit, regenerate, and harm the United States. This 
program stands alone without nation-building efforts, strategies to build local 
support, education programs, or even support by Pakistan to distribute 
nonmilitary U.S. aid. These additional support efforts are necessary to create a 
multifaceted strategic plan that comprehensively attacks terrorists’ ability to 
organize and function. 
 
The United States should be prepared for the reality that unless the Pakistani 
government will do its part to create this infrastructure, its aid programs at the 
local level will be weakened in their ability to curb terrorism. Unfortunately, the 
United States cannot simply walk away from the entire situation because 
Pakistan provides access to supply U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and has provided 
safe harbor for terrorists in the past. Without the cooperation of Pakistan’s 
government to take actions aimed at preventing safe harbor for terrorists and 
maintaining control of their territories, it is likely terrorists will be able to 
reorganize in the FATA territories and in urban areas.  Therefore, the United 
States needs to begin investing in these programs with or without full support of 
Pakistan’s government. Without these systems, Pakistanis will continue to turn 
towards organizations willing to help them establish security, basic amenities, 
and sustainable economies in which to live. Pakistan must deliver basic services 
to promote security, education, and economic prosperity to strengthen their state 
and reduce the number of civilians turning to insurgent groups for protection, 
income, and services. The United States must be ready for the opportunity to help 
Pakistan’s government deliver this as soon as it is able. 
 
The United States has a long history of being effective in combat zones because it 
is able to gain the hearts and minds of the locals, while fighting the enemy. The 
drone program brings the fight, but building socio-economic structures through 
education, propaganda, aid, and local relationships builds the trust of the 
communities and wins them to the United States’ cause. The drone programs do 
deter individuals to work with insurgents and terrorists because it creates fear 
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and a consequence to actions. However, the problem is that fear alone will not 
stop terrorist actions without a substantial balance of positive investment. Socio-
economic investment creates alternatives to Taliban and al-Qaida programs that 
currently fill these voids. While building support campaigns around the drone 
program to help the Pakistani government address systemic issues, the United 
States should continue leveraging the drone campaign to disrupt terrorist groups’ 
organization and communication. This provides a balance of soft power to 
support communities with the hard power of the drone attacks. The investment 
by the United States to rebuild and revitalize the Pakistani state should 
eventually reduce anti-American hostility and reduce the appeal of terrorist 
organizations to the Pakistanis. The drone program is not completely hopeless; it 
just needs a support by a multifaceted, long-term strategy to be truly effective at 
stopping terrorism and reducing hostility towards the United States. 
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